Introduction
============

The recent economic downturn has reawakened national concern about the problem of the uninsured. While the proportion of the population without health insurance decreased from 1998 (16.3 percent) to 2000 (14 percent) ([@b14-hcfr-26-2-073]; [@b15-hcfr-26-2-073]), the recent economic recession and associated loss of jobs has exacerbated the problem. Between March and November of 2001, nearly one million individuals lost their jobs and their health care coverage; one-half of these losses occurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ([@b4-hcfr-26-2-073]). The increase in the number of uninsured in 2001 was the largest one-year increase in nearly a decade with 2.2 million losing coverage ([@b3-hcfr-26-2-073]). An additional 2.4 million people lost coverage in 2002 ([@b10-hcfr-26-2-073]). With higher unemployment and lower consumer spending, State tax revenues are down and budget deficits have reappeared. Consequently, Medicaid budgets are tight and some States have cut optional populations from their programs to reduce expenditures ([@b11-hcfr-26-2-073]; [@b12-hcfr-26-2-073]).

Among the growing number of uninsured is a class of individuals most in need of insurance: the uninsurable. These are individuals with potentially costly health conditions who pose a high risk to any insurance carrier and who cannot obtain health care coverage due to medical underwriting.[^1^](#fn2-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} In 29 States (as of July 2002), these high-risk, uninsurable individuals are eligible for coverage under special State programs known as comprehensive health insurance plans for high-risk individuals (high-risk pools). All high-risk pools offer coverage for a subsidized premium that is, nevertheless, above standard rates. Though operations vary by State, subsidy financing is generally provided by assessments on private carriers, general State revenue, other public sources (e.g., tobacco-settlement funds), or a combination of these.

High-risk pools have quietly become an important component in the Nation\'s public/private patchwork of health care coverage. The number of high-risk pools has been gradually growing along with enrollment since the first pools began operation in Connecticut and Minnesota in 1976. Recently, the 1996 HIPAA has encouraged this growth by requiring States to guarantee health insurance portability (i.e., that health insurance is available) to individuals who meet certain requirements. High-risk pools have been designated as one of the State Alternative Mechanisms (SAMs) for compliance with the portability provisions of HIPAA, although the act does not endorse high-risk pools above all other alternatives. Moreover, HIPAA established a Federal regulatory role over States that do not select an acceptable portability mechanism. CMS is responsible for undertaking periodic reviews to determine which States have SAMs that are in compliance with HIPAA. In addition, CMS directly exercises Federal authority in States that are not in compliance. Since this Federal authority overrides what would otherwise be a State prerogative, HIPAA creates an incentive for States to select an alternative mechanism, thereby strengthening the position of high-risk pool advocates.

In this article, we combine high-risk pool operational data with State demographic and health insurance data to investigate the historical growth in high-risk pools and the affordability of high-risk pool premiums. We also study the potential for enrollment growth if the premium subsidies were increased.

Data
====

We constructed a database consisting of high-risk pool operational data linked to State demographic data. High-risk pool operational data (number of enrollees, actual premiums charged, statutory premium caps, and other financial and benefits data) for the years 1981-2000 were obtained from [@b2-hcfr-26-2-073].

Most State demographic measures (State population, number of uninsured, number of uninsurable, income statistics) were obtained or constructed from the Current Population Survey March Supplement (CPS) ([@b16-hcfr-26-2-073]). We chose the CPS because the data are relatively current, they are comprehensive on demographics and income, and reasonably so on health insurance. Additionally, by using the standard technique of pooling 3 years of data, we were able to obtain adequate sample sizes for annual State-level descriptive analysis from CPS data.[^2^](#fn3-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} Because high-risk pools serve uninsurable individuals, we needed a measure of the number of uninsurable persons in each State. Unfortunately, we are aware of no broadly accepted statistics on this topic, so we developed an approximation, defining the uninsurable population for each State as individuals who were uninsured and who either could not work, were limited in the type of work they could do, or received any disability or worker\'s compensation income.[^3^](#fn4-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} The remaining data items, namely per capita Medicare expenditures, were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States ([@b16-hcfr-26-2-073]).

The resulting data set consists of 335 observations, each representing a high-risk pool in a single State for a single year during the period from 1981-2000. All of these observations include CFA operational data and the 188 State-year observations corresponding to the years 1995-2000 also include statistical abstract and CPS data.

Descriptive Results
===================

Pool Growth
-----------

Three high-risk pools were operating by 1981. The Connecticut and Minnesota pools opened in 1976 and Wisconsin\'s began operation in 1981. From 1981 to 2000, the number of States with high-risk pools increased nearly every year ([Table 1](#t1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"}). The only year in which the number of pools decreased is 1995, when Tennessee folded its high-risk pool into TennCare.[^4^](#fn5-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} [Table 1](#t1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} also shows the number of States that use a high-risk pool as the State alternative mechanism to satisfy the portability requirements of HIPAA. Since the passage of HIPAA in 1996, most States with high-risk pools began offering pool coverage to HIPAA-eligible individuals to satisfy the new portability requirements. Two States created high-risk pools specifically in reaction to the passage of HIPAA (Alabama and Texas) and several new pools have opened more recently (Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Maryland, all too new to be included in this study). Only 4 of the 27 pools operating in 2000 were not HIPAA pools---California, Florida, Missouri, and Washington State.

Corresponding to the growth in the number of high-risk pools, [Table 1](#t1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} shows nearly steady growth in the number of pool enrollees. The only period of decline was from 1994-1997. During this period, Tennessee folded its pool into TennCare, which accounts for part of the decrease in 1995. The period of declining enrollment also immediately follows or coincides with the passage of small- and non-group insurance reforms in many States ([@b18-hcfr-26-2-073]). These reforms may have been associated with reduced financial support for high-risk pools, given the expectation at the time that insurance reform would reduce the need for pool coverage.

The number of individuals with high-risk pool coverage is very small relative to the number of uninsured, as shown in [Table 2](#t2-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"}. However, this number is larger, and in some States substantial, relative to the numbers of medically uninsurable (the target population for the pools).[^5^](#fn6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} Presumably due to its low premiums, Minnesota\'s pool is the largest in absolute terms (with 25,892 covered in 2000) and relative to the State\'s uninsured and uninsurable populations (covering 6 and 54 percent, respectively). The figures for Minnesota are far above the national averages; nationally, high-risk pool enrollment is 0.5 percent of the total uninsured population and 8 percent of the uninsurable population.

Barriers to Enrollment
----------------------

Of all the possible barriers to high-risk pool enrollment, two stand out as the most significant: enrollment caps or freezes and high premiums.[^6^](#fn7-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} California has an enrollment cap and only sells as many policies as it can finance with revenue from a tobacco tax (17,343 in 2000). There is a waiting list of about 4,000 individuals, each expected to wait about a year before being permitted to enroll in California\'s pool. Florida has an enrollment freeze. In a political settlement with the insurance industry (which protested the size of assessments for pool subsidy funding), Florida\'s pool has been closed to new enrollment since 1990 and enrollment has declined from a high of 7,500 in that year to 709 in 2000. A pool with an enrollment cap or freeze on HIPAA eligible individuals does not comply with HIPAA regulations, so the pools in Florida and California are not HIPAA pools and could not be unless changes were made to enrollment policy. Note, however, that to comply with HIPAA, a State cannot impose a cap on HIPAA eligibles, but may impose one on enrollees eligible for other reasons (e.g., Louisiana and Illinois).

The most pervasive barrier to enrollment is affordability. In all States, high-risk pool premiums, while subsidized, are above standard rates. Only a small number of States offer additional subsidies for low-income individuals (Wisconsin, Connecticut, New Mexico, Oregon, and Colorado). Consequently, for most people and in most States, high-risk pool premiums are above the already high non-group market rates, rendering high-risk pool coverage unaffordable for many who cannot obtain coverage in any other way.

To provide a sense of the financial burden imposed by pool premiums, [Table 3](#t3-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} lists the percents of all individuals, the uninsured, and the uninsurable, for whom the pool premium[^7^](#fn8-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} is greater than 25 percent and for whom it is less than 10 percent of family income. Although there is no standard of affordability, the 25 and 10 percent thresholds are intended to serve as rough guides. [Table 3](#t3-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} shows, for example, that nationally, high-risk pool premiums are above 25 percent of family income (i.e., are unaffordable) for 10 percent of all individuals, 18 percent of the uninsured, and 29 percent of the uninsurable. By these standards, almost one-third of the uninsurable are unable to afford high-risk pool coverage, although there are large variations by State with Minnesota\'s premiums being the most affordable to its population and Kansas\' among the least. Note that only 22 of the 27 high-risk pool States are listed in [Table 3](#t3-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} because premium data were not available for five States (Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska).

Simulating the Implications of Lower Premiums
=============================================

Given that affordability is a significant barrier to enrollment, it seems likely that lowering premiums would raise enrollment. To evaluate how much enrollment could grow if premiums were reduced, we conducted a simulation of the impact of lowering all premiums to the level seen in the most generous States.[^8^](#fn9-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"}

To conduct the simulation, we first estimated the elasticity of enrollment with respect to premiums using regression methods. The log of enrollment was modeled as a function of the log of high-risk pool premium, the level of benefits, the size and income of the State\'s uninsured population, and the year. The unit of observation was the State/year. Note that we use measures of the uninsured population as opposed to the uninsurable population because the former is clearly identifiable in the CPS data while the latter is less so due to previously discussed limitations of CPS data.

We began with the specification
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where the subscript s indicates State, the subscript *t* indicates year and all the variables are as defined in [Table 4](#t4-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"}.[^9^](#fn10-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} Refer to Technical Note A for the theoretical model that underlies [equation 1](#fd1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"}. Because the actual high-risk pool premium was not available for enough States and years to permit the estimation of [equation 1](#fd1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"}, we used a proxy defined as
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where per capita Medicare expenditure serves as a proxy for State-to-State/year-to-year variation in the actual market premium. The percent of market premium variable was established through interviews with State high-risk pool administrators and is often, but not always, set at the statutory maximum. In cases where administrators could not supply the percent of market premium, we used the statutory maximum.

One problem with this specification is that plan administrators might adjust premium levels in reaction to unexpected enrollment changes. In particular, if enrollment is higher than budgeted, plan administrators might raise premiums in an effort to keep enrollment and losses in line with legislative expectations. Thus, to the extent that enrollment changes might cause premium changes, the premium variable in [equation 1](#fd1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} is endogenous. To address this endogeneity, we estimate [equation 1](#fd1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} by instrumental variables using lagged values of the log of proxy premium, the percent of market premium, and per capita Medicare expenditure as instruments for the log of proxy premium.

[Table 5](#t5-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} provides the estimated coefficients for [equation 1](#fd1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} using the proxy premium of [equation 2](#fd2-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} and instrumental variables as described. Our estimate of elasticity of enrollment with respect to premium for this specification is -1.9, which is the value used in the simulation that follows. A variety of other specifications were studied and comparable results were obtained.

Other researchers have also consistently found that individual insurance purchase responds to price, although magnitudes vary according to the population studied and the source of price variation ([@b1-hcfr-26-2-073]; [@b5-hcfr-26-2-073]; [@b8-hcfr-26-2-073]; [@b9-hcfr-26-2-073]; and [@b13-hcfr-26-2-073]). In general, our elasticity is larger in magnitude as compared with those in the literature, which are typically below one in absolute value. However, the market for high-risk pools is unique in that potential enrollees are known to have higher expected health care utilization than the general public as well as being older, having lower incomes, and being less likely to be working. Moreover, high-risk pool enrollees typically pay the entire premium, in contrast to individuals with employer-based group insurance. So, it is reasonable to expect an elasticity larger in magnitude. In a study of disenrollment from eight States\' high-risk pools, [@b13-hcfr-26-2-073] observe that severalfold increases in disenrollment rates occurred at the time of selected premium increases, though the degree of response varied across States. Their results are consistent with an elasticity the magnitude of the one we estimate (Technical Note B).

As [Table 6](#t6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} shows, our preferred elasticity estimate of -1.9 implies that if premiums were set to no higher than 125 percent of market rate, enrollment would grow by 33 percent, nationally, reaching 11 percent of the uninsurable (up from 8 percent in 2000---[Table 2](#t2-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"}). Enrollment growth varies by State, depending on how far current pool premiums are from 125 percent of market rate (Technical Note C).

Using premium, claims, and assessment funding figures from CFA, we can calculate a simple approximation of the cost of subsidizing all premiums to 125 percent of market rates. The increase in cost has two components. The first is the change in enrollment multiplied by the difference between the average claim per person and the new premium. The second is the number of current enrollees multiplied by the change in premium.[^10^](#fn11-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"}

An order of magnitude estimate of the annual additional cost of reducing premiums to 125 percent of market rate is about \$105 million nationally, or about \$2,800 per new enrollee per year (Appendix D). This figure assumes no change in the level of assessment funding currently provided in each State and does not include administrative costs. We acknowledge that a major challenge facing any policymaker wishing to finance high-risk pool expansion is how to do it without displacing current funding (a variant of the crowd-out problem[^11^](#fn12-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"}); however, our purpose here is only to develop a first approximation of what might be possible, postponing such implementation issues.

One additional lesson emerges from this simulation. As [Table 6](#t6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} indicates, even when premiums are fixed at approximately the same level relative to the market, States differ dramatically with respect to the proportion of the uninsurable that would be covered. Six States are projected to cover between 20 and 55 percent, eight States are between 10 and 19 percent, and the remaining States are in the low, single digits. These results underscore the fact that considerations other than premium levels have substantial effects on enrollment. Some of these factors could be circumstantial, such as the relative availability of charity care, and some could reflect characteristics of the high-risk pools, such as the extent of marketing and the attractiveness of benefits.

Although this simulation was intended only as a rough approximation, several cautions still apply. First, the proxy premium used in our preferred specification implicitly assumes that per capita Medicare spending is closely correlated with market rates for individual insurance policies. We acknowledge that this assumption is impossible to verify; nevertheless, some support can be drawn from the fact that elasticity estimates were similar across specifications using actual premiums and proxy premiums. Second, we acknowledge that benefits influence enrollment, but we were only able to include a few covariates to control for differences in benefits due to limitations of sample size and inconsistent reporting of benefits across States and years. The fact that specifications including State-fixed effects produced similar elasticity estimates partially mitigates this concern, provided the most important differences in benefits between States were stable through time. Finally, our definition of uninsurable is by necessity somewhat arbitrary. It is likely that a different definition would produce different results, particularly if the chosen definition included substantially more individuals.

Policy Discussion
=================

Other than encouraging the establishment of high-risk pools, the influence of Federal regulation on access to those pools has been modest to date. Of the two chief barriers to access, enrollment caps or freezes and affordability, HIPAA only addresses the first one, establishing that a high-risk pool must not impose restrictions on the number of HIPAA eligible enrollees in order to be an acceptable portability mechanism (25 of the 27 high-risk pools in operation in 2000 satisfy this criterion, though only 23 are HIPAA pools).

Most States do not provide additional premium subsidization for low-income pool applicants. Therefore, for much of the high-risk target population (the medically uninsurable) high-risk pool coverage is unaffordable. Federal regulation regarding the degree of affordability of high-risk pools could encourage additional enrollment and lead to an increase in coverage for the uninsurable population.

Of course, the benefits of lower premiums come at a cost. For about \$105 million in additional premium subsidization, high-risk pool enrollment could be expected to grow by about 33 percent and increase coverage of the uninsurable population from 8 to 11 percent. While this increase may be modest, this is a population most in need of coverage and likely to rely on substantial amounts of high-cost emergency care if uninsured.

The fact that substantial projected enrollment variation remains among States after adjusting for premium differences suggests that significant enrollment growth could be encouraged even without additional premium subsidies. In the course of their regular reviews of State alternative mechanisms under HIPAA, it would be reasonable for regulators to focus their attention on the operations of pools with relatively low enrollment, controlling for premium. In addition to improving understanding of the factors that explain enrollment variations, it is possible that such a ranking by itself would serve as an effective incentive for State policymakers and pool administrators to seek to minimize barriers to access.

For the purposes of this discussion, we have sidestepped several challenging issues associated with an increase in the Federal role. Federal regulation involves questions of Federal versus State authority, funding for the Federal activity, information requirements for monitoring, among other things. Moreover, to be effective, regulators must have strategies to prevent unintended consequences such as the use of Federal money to underwrite current costs, rather than expand coverage. Thus, the results of this article should be interpreted as an example of what is possible under ideal circumstances in which these other issues are resolved.

Given the prevailing fiscal climate and the political challenge of simply maintaining the current level of high-risk pool funding, additional funding is unlikely to come from State sources. Federal action, therefore, appears to be the most feasible instrument of expansion in the near future. This study shows that, building on the foundation established by HIPAA, the combination of new Federal funding and Federal affordability and enrollment guidelines could significantly expand access to health insurance for those currently unable to acquire it.

Epilogue
========

In December 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced the first round of grants to States with high-risk pools (about \$30 million to 16 States). The grants, authorized in the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002, are available only to States with risk-pool premiums no higher than 150 percent of the market rate. States satisfying this and other criteria can apply for a grant totaling up to 50 percent of the losses incurred in risk-pool operation. While it is too soon to tell what effect the grants will have on high-risk pool enrollment, their intent is to encourage the expansion of access to high-risk pool coverage through reduction in premiums ([@b17-hcfr-26-2-073]).

Technical Note A
================

Theoretical Model
-----------------

The theoretical model that underlies the empirical work presented in this article begins with the assumption that premiums and benefits are set by high-risk pools prior to enrollment decisions. That is, individuals choose to enroll with full knowledge of the benefits package and cost sharing. We also assume that the elasticity of supply is infinite, i.e., that supply will meet demand, and that elasticity of demand ε~T~, is constant. The infinite supply elasticity assumption justifies the exclusion of pools that impose constraints on enrollment (California and Florida) from our estimation of elasticity of demand. Finally, we assume that total enrollment is a complete measure of demand, i.e., that everyone who wishes to enroll does so. This justifies the exclusion of pools that are too new to have signed up everyone who wishes to enroll (Texas).

[Figure 1](#f1-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fig"} illustrates some of our assumptions. The horizontal axis is total enrollment, T, and the vertical axis is premium, P. Since the elasticity of supply is infinite, the supply curve is a horizontal line. Thus, the point of equilibrium, where demand meets supply, is uniquely determined by the demand curve and demand is measured as total enrollment, T.

The equation governing the demand curve takes the form
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Demand, T, is a function of premium, P with an elasticity ε~T~, which is expected to be negative. All other things being equal, demand should increase with the generosity of benefits. Demand should be higher in State-years with larger uninsured populations since there would be more individuals in need of high-risk pool coverage. Demand should be higher if the population in need of high-risk pool coverage has higher income. Finally, year controls for secular trends in the health insurance market.

Technical Note B
================

Comparison of Elasticity Estimate to Stearns and Mroz
-----------------------------------------------------

[@b13-hcfr-26-2-073] compute an elasticity of disenrollment with respect to premium for high-risk pools in eight States. Using some simple calculus, we convert disenrollment elasticity into an upper bound on elasticity of total enrollment.[^12^](#fn13-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} We find that the average upper bound on total enrollment elasticity based on the results of Stearns and Mroz is -1.5, which is consistent with the estimate obtained in this article (because −1.9 is less than the upper-bound of −1.5).

Let T~i~, D~i~, and E~i~ represent total enrollment, number of disenrollees, and number of enrollees during period i, then
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Differentiating [Eq. B.1](#fd4-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} with respect to premium for period 1, P~1~, and multiplying by P~1~/T~1~ we find an expression for elasticity of total enrollment, ε~T~, in terms of changes in E~1~ and D~1~.
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We can express ε~T~ in terms of elasticity of enrollment, ε~E~, elasticity of disenrollment, ε~D~, enrollment rate, r~E~, and disenrollment rate, r~D~:
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All quantities on the right-hand-side of [Eq. B.3](#fd6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} are non-negative except ε~E~, which is non-positive.[^13^](#fn14-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"} Therefore, the first term on the right-hand-side of [Eq. B.3](#fd6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} is negative. Dropping it yields an upper-bound on ε~T~:
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Stearns and Mroz study the effect of an upward premium shock on disenrollment in eight States. For each State, they estimate a disenrollment elasticity, ε~D~, and a disenrollment rate, r~D~. Using these and [Eq. B.6](#fd9-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"}, we can estimate an upper-bound on total enrollment elasticity for each State and an average across States. For example, the annualized disenrollment rate for Iowa is r~D~ = 0.2 and the disenrollment elasticity is ε~D~ = 10.2. Thus, ε~T~ \< -2.0. The average upper-bound computed in this way is ε~T~ \< −1.5. This is strong support that the −1.9 value computed in this article is a reasonable estimate of the elasticity of total enrollment for high-risk pools.[^14^](#fn15-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="fn"}

Technical Note C
================

Example Simulation Calculation
------------------------------

Below we provide an example calculation of the simulated enrollments provided in [Table 6](#t6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"}. This example is for the State of Alabama. Let T be total enrollment and P be premium and eT be elasticity of total enrollment with respect to premium. Then, by definition
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To simulate a change in T requires use of an approximation to ε~T~. Our approximation is
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Using [Eq. C.2](#fd11-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="disp-formula"} and letting T~0~, T~1~, P~0~, and P~1~ be original enrollment, new (simulated enrollment), original premium, and new (lower) premium, respectively, the equation for simulated enrollment is
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Using data for Alabama, the calculation is as follows.

Original Premium (P~0~)
-----------------------

Per capita Medicare spending (proxy premium) = \$5,901.84

Premium as percent of market = 175%

P~0~ = 1.75 × \$5901.84 = \$10,328.22

log(P~0~)= 9.25

Original Enrollment (T~0~)
--------------------------

T~0~ = 2,431

log(T~0~) = 7.80

New, Lower Premium (P1)
-----------------------

Premium as percent of market = 125%

P~1~ = 1.25 × 5901.84 = \$7,377.30

log(P~1~) = 8.91

New, Simulated Enrollment Calculation (T~0~)
--------------------------------------------

T~1~=exp\[log(T~0~)+ε~T~(log(P~1~)−log(P~0~))\] =exp(7.80−1.9×(8.91- 9.25))=exp(8.45)= 4,656

(small difference from [Table 6](#t6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table"} due to rounding of intermediate results).

Technical Note D
================

Confidence Interval of Elasticity Estimate and Range of Enrollment Estimate
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Our elasticity estimate is −1.9. The 95 percent confidence interval is −2.7 to −1.1. This implies a range of predicted enrollment of 134,485 to 179,249 and a cost range of \$55 to \$180 million.
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Medical underwriting is the consideration of medical history in the determination of coverage eligibility.

There are also some limitations of CPS data. The survey does not ask about Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) coverage, which is relevant because one must exhaust COBRA coverage to qualify for the protections established by HIPAA. CPS data are not comprehensive with regard to health status which is relevant to determining who might be uninsurable due to underwriting.

Our approach suggests that roughly 1 percent of the total population and 6 percent of the uninsured population is uninsurable; this is slightly higher than results cited by the State of California, namely that 2.5-5.0 percent of California\'s uninsured are uninsurable due to medical underwriting ([@b7-hcfr-26-2-073]).

TennCare is Tennessee\'s health insurance program for the low-income and uninsurable population, including the Medicaid-eligible population. Because the uninsurable population is just a small part of TennCare, it does not operate like a standard high-risk pool and should not be viewed as one.

The target population are those who cannot obtain insurance in the standard (group/individual) market. This includes those estimated as uninsurable from CPS data and high-risk pool enrollees (virtually all high-risk pool enrollees would be uninsurable if not enrolled). Consequently, we calculated percents of uninsurable (target population) as (pool enrollment/\[pool enrollment + CPS estimate of uninsurable\]) × 100.

Benefits also affect desirability of the product. However, due to inconsistent reporting of benefits across States and years, we were unable to analyze the relationship between benefits and enrollment.

For consistency, we used a single, standard premium (that for a 35-year old, non-smoking male at the lowest deductible and with no optional features).

Four States (California, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Oregon) set their premiums at 125 percent of the market rate. This is the standard used for the simulation. One State, Colorado, sets premiums at 118 percent of the market rate. States conduct market surveys to determine the market rate, but we do not have access to these market surveys.

Three States are excluded when estimating coefficients: California (enrollment is capped), Florida (pool is closed), and Texas (not in equilibrium).

This method is not precise about the level of subsidy spending in each State for two reasons. First, subsidy spending does not track claims on an annual basis---losses in one year are offset by revenues in following years. Second, subsidy spending may occur in forms not easily accounted for, e.g., as low-income premium subsidies.

The term crowd out is typically applied to situations where expanded public services (e.g., Medicaid) cause privately financed services to be reduced ([@b6-hcfr-26-2-073]).

We distinguish between total enrollees (the number of individuals enrolled at a fixed point in time), enrollees (the number of individuals who enter in a period), and disenrollees (the number of individuals who leave in a period). An elasticity can be associated with each of these: elasticity of total enrollment, elasticity of enrollment, and elasticity of disenrollment, respectively.

That enrollment and disenrollment rates, r~E~ and r~D~, respectively, are non-negative is obvious. That elasticity of disenrollment, ε~D~, is non-negative is clear from theory (disenrollment increases as price rises) and is demonstrated empirically by [@b13-hcfr-26-2-073]. That elasticity of enrollment, eE, is non-positive is clear from theory (enrollment decreases as price rises).

Note that a negative upper-bound (e.g., -1.5) implies that numbers more negative (e.g., -1.9) are consistent.

Reprint Requests: Austin B. Frakt, Ph.D., Health Care Financing & Economics, 150 S. Huntington Avenue, Mail Stop 152H, Boston, MA 02130. E-mail: <frakt@bu.edu>
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###### Number of Enrollees and High-Risk Pools: 1981-2000

  Year   Total Number of Enrollees   Number of Pools   Number of HIPAA Pools
  ------ --------------------------- ----------------- -----------------------
  1981   6,668                       3                 0
  1982   9,199                       5                 0
  1983   15,448                      6                 0
  1984   19,602                      6                 0
  1985   21,536                      6                 0
  1986   21,833                      7                 0
  1987   24,231                      10                0
  1988   33,301                      12                0
  1989   53,458                      13                0
  1990   68,263                      15                0
  1991   77,683                      17                0
  1992   96,245                      22                0
  1993   101,623                     24                0
  1994   95,536                      24                0
  1995   90,405                      23                0
  1996   86,723                      25                0
  1997   86,555                      25                11
  1998   92,101                      27                22
  1999   104,918                     27                22
  2000   115,688                     27                23

NOTE: HIPAA is Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. SOURCE: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions). Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002.

###### High-Risk Pool Enrollees, by State: 2000

  State            High-Risk Pool Enrollees          
  ---------------- -------------------------- ------ ----
  Total            115,688                    0.45   8
  Alabama          2,431                      0.37   5
  Alaska           395                        0.33   4
  Arkansas         2,270                      0.55   7
  California       17,343                     0.25   6
  Colorado         1,536                      0.25   5
  Connecticut      1,719                      0.51   8
  Florida          709                        0.03   1
  Illinois         10,120                     0.58   10
  Indiana          6,475                      0.89   11
  Iowa             271                        0.11   2
  Kansas           1,283                      0.43   6
  Louisiana        1,088                      0.13   2
  Minnesota        25,892                     6.14   54
  Mississippi      2,231                      0.49   7
  Missouri         889                        0.16   3
  Montana          1,687                      0.99   12
  Nebraska         5,023                      3.03   35
  New Mexico       1,063                      0.25   5
  North Dakota     1,307                      1.68   18
  Oklahoma         1,922                      0.32   3
  Oregon           5,833                      1.22   21
  South Carolina   1,451                      0.25   3
  Texas            8,600                      0.18   4
  Utah             1,106                      0.37   5
  Washington       2,333                      0.29   4
  Wisconsin        10,042                     1.90   21
  Wyoming          669                        0.87   11

SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions). Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1999-2001).

###### Percent of Population for Whom Premium was Either Less Than 10 Percent or More Than 25 Percent of Family Income, by Selected States: 2000

  State                     Premium[^1^](#tfn3-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}   All Individuals   Uninsured   Uninsurable             
  ------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------- ------------- ---- ---- ----
  Alabama                   \$192                                                    9                 72          18            54   31   36
  Alaska                    400                                                      14                57          26            35   36   25
  Arkansas                  153                                                      6                 77          11            61   14   39
  California                280                                                      12                62          19            42   30   36
  Colorado                  214                                                      6                 79          12            56   22   50
  Illinois                  292                                                      11                67          20            46   33   28
  Iowa                      273                                                      9                 65          18            35   27   27
  Kansas                    382                                                      18                50          37            24   51   24
  Minnesota                 128                                                      2                 91          6             82   6    86
  Mississippi               215                                                      11                65          18            46   33   46
  Missouri                  267                                                      10                69          16            49   21   50
  Montana                   252                                                      14                58          26            36   34   24
  New Mexico                202                                                      10                66          16            49   23   48
  North Dakota              223                                                      9                 65          15            46   26   38
  Oklahoma                  224                                                      10                67          15            50   25   40
  Oregon                    232                                                      10                69          20            45   28   26
  South Carolina            268                                                      10                63          20            45   35   29
  Texas                     237                                                      10                67          17            47   24   38
  Utah                      272                                                      7                 73          16            52   25   44
  Washington                266                                                      10                69          20            49   28   41
  Wisconsin                 196                                                      5                 79          16            57   22   55
  Wyoming                   179                                                      6                 79          13            63   20   57
  All of the Above States   ---                                                      10                67          18            46   29   37

Premium in 2001 dollars for a 35-year old, non-smoking male at the lowest deductible, and no optional features as reported by the States to Communicating for Agriculture, Inc. Includes 22 States with high-risk pools and available premium data.

SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions). Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1999-2001).

###### Definition of Variables

  Variable[^1^](#tfn5-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}                                   Definition/Comment                                                                                     Mean      Standard Deviation   Minimum   Maximum
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------- -------------------- --------- ---------
  log(enrollment~s,t~)                                                                      Log of high-risk pool enrollment.                                                                      7.33      1.10                 5.16      10.32
  log(premium~s,t~)                                                                         Log of high-risk pool premium. Only available for 58 observations.                                     5.39      0.31                 4.75      6.05
  log(proxy premium~s,t~)[^2^](#tfn6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}                    Proxy for high-risk pool premimum.                                                                     8.89      0.27                 8.42      9.68
  pct. of market premiums,t                                                                 High-risk pool premium as percent of market premium.                                                   1.52      0.23                 1.18      2
  per capita Medicare expenditure~s,t~                                                      Used as proxy for market premium.                                                                      4,912     924.00               3,139     8,002
  lowest deductible~s,t~                                                                    Controls for generosity of benefits.[^3^](#tfn7-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}                    543.8     235.10               0         1,000
  multiple deductibles~s,t~                                                                 Binary variable; controls for generosity of benefits.[^3^](#tfn7-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.85      0.35                 0         1
  log(uninsured population~s,t~)                                                            Controls for demand.                                                                                   12.81     0.78                 10.87     14.43
  log(per capita family income of uninsured~s,t~)                                           Controls for demand.                                                                                   10.46     0.18                 10.08     10.86
  year~t~                                                                                   Controls for trends in enrollment and premiums                                                         1997.58   1.70                 1995      2,000
  lag log(proxy premium~s,t~) [^2^](#tfn6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}               Used as an additional instrumental variable for log(proxy premium~s,t~).                               8.86      0.27                 8.2       9.68
  lag pct. of market premium~s,t~[^2^](#tfn6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}            Used as an additional instrumental variable for log(proxy premium~s,t~).                               1.52      0.22                 1.25      2
  lag per capita Medicare expenditure~s,t~[^2^](#tfn6-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}   Used as an additional instrumental variable for log(proxy premium~s,t~).                               4,775     992.00               2,425     8,002

Subscript s indexes States (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Subscript t indexes years (1995-2000). Not every State has an observation in every year. Three States are excluded: California (enrollment is capped), Florida (pool is closed), and Texas (not in equilibrium).

As described in the text, to remove endogeneity, we instrumented for log(proxy premium~s,\ t~). The instruments were lag log(proxy premium~s,\ t~), lag pct. of market premium~s,\ t~, and lag per capita Medicare expenditure~s,t~.

Benefits vary by State and year and were not consistently provided in our data sources. Deductible levels, however, were consistently provided and serve as a measure of plan generosity.

NOTE: *N*=137, except where indicated.

SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: *Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions)*. Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1999-2001).

###### Estimation Results (Dependent Variable Log \[enrollment~s,t~\])[^1^](#tfn10-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}

  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Variable                                          Coefficient (Standard Error)
  ------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  log(proxy premium~s,t~)                           [\*\*](#tfn12-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}[\*](#tfn11-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}-1.90\
                                                    (0.41)

  lowest deductible~s,t~                            0.000091\
                                                    (0.0004)

  multiple deductibles~s,t~                         -0.23\
                                                    (0.25)

  log(uninsured population~s,t~)                    [\*\*](#tfn12-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}0.77\
                                                    (0.12)

  log(per capita family income of uninsured~s,t~)   [\*](#tfn11-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}1.03\
                                                    (0.52)

  year~t~                                           0.67\
                                                    (0.051)

  constant                                          -129\
                                                    (100)
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To remove endogeneity, we instrumented for log (proxy premium~s,\ t~). The instruments were lag log(proxy premium~s,\ t~), lag pct. of market premium~s,\ t~, and lag per capita Medicare expenditure~s,\ t~. Three States are excluded: California (enrollment is capped), Florida (pool is closed), and Texas (not in equilibrium).

Significant at the 5.0 percent level.

Significant at the 0.1 percent level.

NOTE: *N* = 137, *R*^2^ = 0.25.

SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions). Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1999-2001). U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1995-2001).

###### Predicted Effect of Reduction in Premiums to 125 Percent of Market Rate, by State: 2000

  State                                                        Premium as Percent of Market   Year 2000 Enrollment   Simulated Enrollment[^1^](#tfn15-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}   Simulated Enrollment Relative to       
  ------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------ ---------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- --- ----
  Total                                                                                       115,688                153,666                                                                133                                1   11
  State                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  Alabama                                                      175                            2,431                  4,612                                                                  190                                1   10
  Alaska                                                       200                            395                    966                                                                    245                                1   11
  Arkansas                                                     150                            2,270                  3,212                                                                  141                                1   9
  California^2,3^                                              125                            17,343                 17,343                                                                 100                                0   6
  Colorado[^2^](#tfn16-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}     118                            1,536                  1,536                                                                  100                                0   5
  Connecticut                                                  150                            1,719                  2,432                                                                  141                                1   12
  Florida[^3^](#tfn17-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}      250                            709                    709                                                                    100                                0   1
  Illinois                                                     150                            10,120                 14,318                                                                 141                                1   14
  Indiana                                                      150                            6,475                  9,161                                                                  141                                1   16
  Iowa                                                         150                            271                    383                                                                    141                                0   3
  Kansas                                                       150                            1,283                  1,815                                                                  141                                1   8
  Louisiana                                                    200                            1,088                  2,662                                                                  245                                0   5
  Minnesota[^2^](#tfn16-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}    125                            25,892                 25,892                                                                 100                                6   54
  Mississippi                                                  175                            2,231                  4,233                                                                  190                                1   13
  Missouri                                                     200                            889                    2,175                                                                  245                                0   6
  Montana                                                      150                            1,687                  2,387                                                                  141                                1   16
  Nebraska                                                     135                            5,023                  5,815                                                                  116                                4   41
  New Mexico[^2^](#tfn16-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}   125                            1,063                  1,063                                                                  100                                0   5
  North Dakota                                                 135                            1,307                  1,513                                                                  116                                2   21
  Oklahoma                                                     140                            1,922                  2,385                                                                  124                                0   4
  Oregon[^2^](#tfn16-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}       125                            5,833                  5,833                                                                  100                                1   21
  South Carolina                                               200                            1,451                  3,550                                                                  245                                1   7
  Texas[^3^](#tfn17-hcfr-26-2-073){ref-type="table-fn"}        165                            8,600                  8,600                                                                  100                                0   4
  Utah                                                         150                            1,106                  1,565                                                                  141                                1   7
  Washington                                                   150                            2,333                  3,301                                                                  141                                0   6
  Wisconsin                                                    200                            10,042                 24,567                                                                 245                                5   51
  Wyoming                                                      200                            669                    1,637                                                                  245                                2   27

Enrollment simulated using Δ log(enrollment) = (-1.9) Δ log(premium).

Premiums in these States are already at or below 125 percent of market rates. Therefore, we did not simulate a change in premium in these States, and thus, there is no change in enrollment.

Three States are excluded: California (enrollment is capped), Florida (pool is closed), and Texas (not in equilibrium).

SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc.: Comprehensive Health Insurance for High-Risk Individuals (9th-15th editions). Fargo Falls, MN. 2001/2002. U.S. Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995-2001. Internet address: <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-us.html> (Accessed 2004.) U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1999-2001).
